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What are the major trends of media change in contemporary Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE)? How do these media transformations relate to 
economic, political, social and cultural currents in the region? After a decade 
of democratic optimism from the early 1990s to the 2000s, why did democratic 
media regimes in the region become recently so vulnerable?  Why would the 
level of media freedom and pluralism in the CEE region remain significantly 
more limited than in Western Europe, despite supposedly shared European 
values and policies, and EU membership of the countries in the region? What 
explains variation in the level of media freedom within and across the former 
communist countries? What are the direct and indirect effects of the global 
financial crisis on the trends of democratization vs. authoritarianism in CEE? 
How could eminent newly democratized countries in CEE backslide 
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dramatically to semi-authoritarian hybrid regimes that we usually find in 
former Soviet Eurasia? How do semi-authoritarian regimes control media in 
different CEE countries? Also, how could media studies of the region be 
reinvented to reflect on the shifting geopolitical balance of power, especially 
the emergence of BRICS, the growing influence of Russia, and the war in 
Ukraine? What could comparative post-communist media studies add to our 
analysis and understanding of the new CEE realities? 
These were some of the questions tackled by a recent public roundtable 
discussion entitled "Media, Democracy and Authoritarianism in Central and 
Eastern Europe", held at the Department of Media, Cognition and 
Communication at the University of Copenhagen on April 24, 2015.   
Participants included Auksė Balčytienė (Professor of Journalism, and Vice 
Rector for Public Communication and International Relations, Vytautas 
Magnus University, Lithuania), Péter Bajomi-Lázár (Professor of Media 
Communications, and Head of the Institute of Social Science at the Budapest 
Business School, Hungary),  and Václav Štětka (Senior Researcher, Institute of 
Communication Studies and Journalism, Faculty of Social Science, Charles 
University, Prague, Czech Republic). The panelists have also been working 
together in a major research project entitled “Media and Democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe” between 2009 and 2013 at the University of 
Oxford. The roundtable was convened and moderated by Miklós Sükösd 
(Associate Professor, Department of Media, Cognition and Communication, 
University of Copenhagen). The event was co-sponsored by the Research 
Priority Area on "Media and Communications in Transition Societies" at the 
Department of Media, Cognition and Communication at the University of 
Copenhagen, and the Journal of Media, Cognition and Communication. 
Participants were asked to reflect on their recent research and contextualize it 
among what they consider the most important contemporary issues and 
trends of media and politics in the CEE region. 
De-globalization of media ownership and the instrumentalization of media 
by oligarchs 
Václav Štětka: My response to this question will be largely based on the 
research I did in Oxford, where I studied the transformation of media 
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ownership in CEE and the impact of these processes on editorial autonomy 
and journalistic professionalism in the region (Stetka 2012; Stetka 2013). Right 
now I am based in Prague and shifted my agenda a bit towards political 
communication. However, I am of course still very much interested in 
examining the continuing processes of media ownership transformation, 
because it is a very relevant issue in many CEE countries, with often 
disturbing consequences for media freedom.  
Observing the changing media landscapes across the CEE region, I would 
argue that among the main trends which we can currently identify in many of 
the countries there is the process of de-globalization of media ownership, caused 
by the departure of foreign investment; the simultaneous rise of the local oligarchs 
as new media owners or moguls; and the process of declining professional 
autonomy, combined with the increasing instrumentalization of news media in 
the hands of the new local proprietors. De-globalization has been a direct 
consequence of the impact of the 2008-2009 global economic crisis, which hit 
hard Central and Eastern Europe. Following the sharp decline of the GDP, 
advertising expenditures fell dramatically across CEE. In the Baltic countries, 
but also in Bulgaria or Romania, the decline of advertising expenditure was 
over 50% annually between 2008 and 2010. Of course this has negatively 
affected the revenues of media companies, especially in the print sector, 
which was already struggling with the impact of the internet. Shrinking 
revenues prompted many of the Western media owners and investors to leave 
the ailing markets, because they could not see short- or even mid-term 
profitability in the print market segment. While before the crisis, a large 
number of print media in CEE countries had been owned by German, 
Austrian, Swiss, as well as Scandinavian companies, and in several countries 
foreign ownership was absolutely dominating, today there are barely any 
foreign publishers left in the region.  The process has not stopped even after 
the end of the recession, and is increasingly affecting broadcast media as well. 
In other words, many CEE countries have experienced an almost complete 
reversal of the media ownership situation - from primarily Western to locally-
based ownership – and this has happened in a very short period of time. 
Apart from the withdrawal of Western investors, the other common trend 
currently defining the majority of CEE media markets has been the rise of a 
specific type of owners, namely oligarchs, which replaced the foreign 
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companies. Instead of established transnational media companies like Ringier, 
WAZ, Schibsted, Bonnier or Sanoma, a new breed of local owners showed up. 
Most of these oligarchs are very rich and very influential local business elites, 
people who had largely nothing to do with media before, and whose main 
sources of profit has been elsewhere--energy production and distribution, 
retail, real estate, investments etc. With the exception of Estonia, Slovenia and, 
to some extent, Poland, in all the other Central and Eastern European new EU 
member states it is possible to find at least a couple of major business players 
who are now involved in media publishing or ownership of broadcasting 
company. Certainly, such owners are not a complete novelty to the region, 
and in countries like Romania or Bulgaria they have been present very much 
from the beginning of the transformation process. What is new is that 
nowadays they are becoming very much the only type of players left on the 
scene.   
To illustrate this track I will talk about the Czech Republic, where this process 
of Western media ownership rapidly shifting into the hands of local business 
elite was among the most dramatic of all CEE countries. The Czech Republic 
used to be one of the countries dominated by foreign media ownership before 
the crisis, with the share of foreign investment in most media segments 
reaching up to or even beyond 80%. Nowadays, there are no foreign investors 
among the national newspaper publishers. Instead of them, the press and part 
of the broadcasting media scene is divided among a handful of Czech 
billionaires with little or no previous experience with the media business. 
Arguably, the one receiving the most attention is Andrej Babiš, the owner of 
the Agrofert Group, the biggest food processing and agricultural corporation 
in the country. Having purchased the biggest media house MAFRA in 2013, 
he became the leading media mogul in Czech Republic (see Hájek and 
Štefaniková 2014). With MAFRA, he is the publisher of the two most 
prestigious national newspapers, as well as a chain of regional news weeklies. 
Apart from that, he also controls the biggest nation-wide commercial radio 
station, and it is possible that soon he might be buying the second largest 
commercial television station as well. In 2011 he established a new political 
movement called ANO (meaning YES in Czech, which stands for “the 
Alliance of Dissatisfied Citizens”), widely described as a populist movement. 
He entered Parliament with his party in 2013 as close second and became 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance. So now there is a person who 
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is basically running the country; he is broadly perceived as a more influential 
figure than the actual Prime Minister. He is the second richest person in the 
Czech Republic, and the most influential media mogul. He is currently also 
the most popular politician in the country, and his party is leading the polls. 
This concentration of political, economic and media power in the hands of 
one person is simply unprecedented, and not only in the Czech Republic, but 
also in the region as a whole.  
The question obviously is: what is the motivation of these people for investing 
in the media in times when profitability cannot be guaranteed, especially not 
in the newspaper sector which is currently a profit-losing industry in most of 
the region? We must assume that they own media in order to maintain 
influence, rather than to make a profit directly from publishing. This has been 
recently confirmed by one of the Czech oligarchs, Marek Dospiva, the co-
owner of one of the largest investment groups in Czech Republic called 
PENTA. Following a journalist’s question regarding their plans to invest into 
media, he replied saying “I am not going to beat around the bush: the fact that 
we own media gives us the assurance that it will be more difficult for anyone 
to attack us”. He referred to the media as a “shield”, and also used the 
metaphor of a “nuclear briefcase”, comparing the media to an instrument of 
deterrent, assuring that nobody will dare to wage wars against them 
(Hospodarske Noviny, 2015). 
This is just one illustration of the fact that the Western-style media business 
model is becoming an exception rather than a rule in most countries of the 
CEE region. Media investment is increasingly seen as a political strategy. The 
old commercial models are failing and the new ones have not been found yet. 
The real challenge is how to ensure sustainability and independence of 
quality journalism in these times. There are indeed some promising counter-
tendencies. In several countries we have witnessed the emergence of new 
media platforms and outlets by journalists who left the editorial offices of 
media now owned by oligarchs. Many decent journalists who left, tried to 
establish new outlets, weeklies, online dailies etc. The question, however, is 
whether these initiatives and project will prove financially sustainable in the 
long-term.  
Sükösd: So key trends in the CEE region are de-globalization of media 
ownership, the growing power of oligarchs, declining professional 
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performance, and the emergence of Berlusconi-type actors with multiple 
power, including political and media power as well as economic interests in 
several business sectors. 
Štětka: Yes, let me add that Mr Babiš, the Deputy Prime Minister, has recently 
been called ‘Babisconi’, obviously implying the resemblance to Berlusconi. 
However, there is a difference. Berlusconi made his political career by using 
his television empire, while Babiš has never been that much dependent on 
television. He is not a visually charismatic person, unlike Berlusconi who has 
effectively exploited his charisma on television.   
Decreasing media freedom and pluralism: the political factors 
Péter Bajomi-Lázár: Regarding the freedom and pluralism of the media, if you 
look at the comparative data produced by Freedom House and by Reporters 
Without Borders, they show a deficit of media freedom in many of the former 
communists countries that joined the EU in the 2000s. My first question 
would be this: why is media freedom more constrained in the ‘East’ than the ‘West’? 
The second question is, how to explain spatial and temporal variations in the level 
of media freedom within and across the former communist countries? In other 
words, why is it that under some governments, media freedom flourishes, 
while it declines virtually overnight when a new government takes office? A 
third question is, why is it that after 25 years of various media policy proposals 
formulated by professional and civic organizations to improve the status of media 
freedom in general, and the accountability and political independence of public 
service broadcasters in particular, virtually none of these recommendations have ever 
been implemented in practice? In other words, why is it that the status of media 
freedom, and particularly the freedom of the public service media, has not improved in 
CEE?  
A first-hand explanation is that media policy is not a magic weapon; you 
cannot change media systems without changing political systems and 
political culture. This is what Karol Jakubovicz and Miklós Sükösd (2008) 
called “mimetic transplantation” of Western media models in emerging 
Central and Eastern European democracies, a process which, in my view, has 
largely failed. For example, you cannot ‘import’ the BBC model of public 
service broadcasting to Hungary or the Czech Republic or Lithuania without 
also ‘importing’ the British political system where the BBC is embedded and 
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where there is a consensual political culture, fair competition, and a quasi 
two-party system. 
Of course, when it comes to media freedom or the deficit of it, and one 
attempts to answer the question of why media freedom has not consolidated 
in many of the former communist countries, one must consider a number of 
factors. These include political institutions, political culture, economic 
performance, the level of professionalization of journalists, the behaviour of 
media owners, and the attitudes of the public towards media freedom. There 
are also some possible external factors such as pressure by the European 
Union in the event media freedom is breached. 
I have decided to take a look at political institutions and culture, because the 
status of media freedom is most likely to change after changes in government, 
whereas the other factors such as the performance of the economy, the 
professionalisation of journalists and the attitudes of the public do not change 
overnight. Therefore the most influential factor that may affect media 
freedom is the political setting.  
In this research, which I summarised in my recent book (Bajomi-Lázár 2014) I 
followed the tradition recently revived by Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini 
(2004) and argue that political systems have a major influence on media systems. A 
key issue is that of party systems. There are a number of differences in party 
systems in the ‘East’ and the ‘West’. For example, party systems in the ‘West’ 
are, as a main rule, consolidated. Most parties have many members and a 
high level of trust, as opposed to most Central and Eastern European 
countries. In Western Europe, party splits are rare and parties have historical 
roots; they do not change ideologies overnight. Electoral volatility is also 
lower than in the ‘East’. Parties in the ‘West’ have stronger social roots, while 
political parties are poorly embedded in society in the ‘East’. (Weaker social 
embeddedness is a common feature of all second and third wave 
democracies, because these are new parties which did not have the time to 
establish strong links with society.) This leads to the emergence of cartel 
parties in the ‘East’. Cartel parties are engaged in state capture in an attempt to 
extract resources that are needed for party building and organisation. Cartel 
parties also capture and exploit public/state media. Public service 
broadcasters, national news agencies and media authorities are in control of 
large sums of money and other resources such as senior managerial positions, 
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advertising funds, newspaper subsidies, programme production funds, radio 
and television frequencies. Through media capture, these resources can be 
channelled to party cadres and clients in exchange for various favours 
granted to the party in the past or to be offered in the future, especially 
during election campaigns. 
This is what I labelled as party colonisation of the media: parties colonise the 
state media and exploit their resources through a nomenklatura system 
constituted by party cadres and clients. Interviews conducted by Václav, 
other colleagues and myself in these countries over four years confirmed that 
this is one of the motivations for media capture. Many of the political elites 
interviewed during the field trips confirmed that the media’s impact on 
public opinion and voting behaviour is often questionable. In fact, pro-
government bias in the media might have a boomerang effect so it might 
alienate voters rather than mobilise them. This is a recurring pattern.  
In countries where civil societies are weak and professional organisations are 
divided along political cleavages, political parties have a de facto monopoly 
over policy making, including media policy making and the control over the 
distribution of resources. On the surface, rhetorics of media freedom and 
pluralism prevail, mainly in the preambles of all media laws. But, beyond 
this, media law is widely conceived as a means to redistribute resources 
among clients of political parties and some of the oligarchs associated with 
parties. Media is captured through the capture of media policy and media 
law, creating new nomenclature systems that allow parties to delegate people to 
key decision-making positions in control of media resources. 
This difference in party systems might explain the deficit of media freedom in the 
‘East’ as opposed to the ‘West’. But how to explain variation in media freedom 
within and across Central and Eastern European countries? 
In my recent research, I chose ten governments in five countries with the 
same share of seats in parliament, i.e., with the same means and possibilities 
to pass new media legislation and to take control of the media. What I found 
was that media freedom was improving under some governments, but 
deteriorating under others. While I tried to identify recurring patterns, I 
found that party colonisation of the media is a widespread practice in many 
of the region’s countries, but the actual patterns are different. There are the 
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patterns of one-party colonisation vs. multi-party colonisation of the media. In the 
former case, one party, or a party coalition or association, has privileged 
access to all media resources. In the second case, under multi-party media 
colonisation regimes, the ‘media pie’ is divided among the various political 
parties, i.e., no single party has privileged and dominant influence over the 
media. Therefore pluralism and freedom of media is largely preserved; 
parties can mutually mitigate other parties’ efforts to control media through 
their representatives on the media boards. The recurring pattern I found was 
that party colonisation of the media may have negative impact on the level of 
media freedom in case of governments that are constituted by one party, 
whose internal decision-making structures are centralized, and which are 
headed by strong-hand leaders who personally do not tolerate media 
criticism, and have a strong ideological agenda (whether a right- or a left-
wing agenda does not seem to make a difference). By contrast, multi-party 
governments or coalition governments of parties with more democratic 
internal decision-making structures, and headed by pragmatic or technocratic 
leaders tolerant of media criticism, were more likely to respect media 
freedom, and under these governments the status of media freedom 
improved.  
To the question of why media policy proposals often fail, the answer would be 
that the deficit of media freedom might be explained by both proximative and 
ultimative factors. Proximative factors include media policy frameworks, i.e. 
the institutions that are theoretically designed to protect media freedom, but 
are in fact used as means to instrumentalise political control over the media. 
Ultimative factors responsible for the deficit of media freedom have to do with 
party systems. Parties try to stabilise their position, but, when lacking the 
resources needed, capture the state and the media. 
It follows that media systems cannot be improved by media proposals alone, but the 
entire political system needs to be addressed. For example, if a country has a 
proportional election system, then that country will be more likely to have a 
coalition government, because mixed election systems and majoritarian 
election systems, in line with Maurice Duverger’s law, favour two- and two-
and-a-half party parliaments and single-party governments. Party funding is 
also an issue. Improved party funding could decrease parties’ incentives to 
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capture the state and the media in search of resources. Parties’ internal 
democracy could also be possibly improved via new party regulation. 
In sum, the stronger the government, the weaker the media, and vice versa. The 
more veto points there are in the system, the more freedom the media have.  
Because political systems have a major impact on media systems, media 
freedom can only be improved by reforming election and party systems in 
CEE. 
Sükösd: The key trends are, again, party colonisation of media and 
oligarchization. You also added different types of party systems as an 
important factor for the variation in media freedom, and the political culture 
surrounding the hard institutional models of politics and media that in 
principle could produce a better outcome in terms of media freedom. 
Socio-cultural perspectives 
Auksė Balčytienė: I would like to offer here another ‘macro’-level perspective. 
On the one hand, a bird’s eye view on political and media transformations in 
CEE allows the analysis of the outcomes of changes in the time of extreme 
transformations. Yet on the other hand it also captures various contextual 
specificities and cultural characteristics registered in institutional structures 
and cultural ways of life in the region. 
From what has been observed and identified, one can suggest that Central 
and Eastern Europe, could be studied as a ‘test case’, a kind of ‘social 
laboratory’ where specific developments such as extreme ‘individualization’, 
also ‘group polarization’ are witnessed, identified and tested (Balčytienė 
2015). These developments are also seen and highly disputed in the Western 
countries. However, it seems that the qualitative aspects of these tendencies – 
often found in attitudes and values of high competitiveness and rivalry, 
consumerism and market-orientation – are more prevailing in younger than 
older democracies.  
Several causes might be considered here. In the last decades of the 20th 
century, the CEE countries were indeed privileged, because they got an 
opportunity to rebuild their states and to return to self-government. This 
move was especially significant for the three Baltic countries, since they 
literally re-appeared on Europe’s map. However, in spite of high hopes and 
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enthusiasm, people of newly emerging democracies have found themselves 
also among those highly disadvantaged. They had to face all changes in a very 
rapid manner and within a very concise period of time and, even more, in the 
frame of high intensity of myriad changes (Bauman and Donskis, 2013). In the 
longer run, this has brought emotional strains and anxieties, such as increasing 
uncertainty that massively escalates feelings of insecurity, tiredness and even 
fatigue in daily matters (Balčytienė 2015). In terms of public perceptions, 
transitional societies and countries with former authoritarian or totalitarian 
experience do not score equally with the Western countries in their feelings of 
happiness and confidence and satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, 
nor in their assessment of media as being free and qualified to meet expected 
(normative) ideals. 
 
 
Chart 1. The relationship of “Feeling happy” and “Assessing one’s 
country as democratic” in selected European countries  
Source: Balčytienė and Juraitė (2015, in press): authors’ estimations based 
on ESS (2012) data. 
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Hence I would like to propose a ‘socio-cultural perspective’, which views the 
process of transformations and democratization in CEE not only as an 
institutional change and re-configuration, but predominantly as a socio-
cultural progression. Such an approach looks at democratization and media 
freedom based on decisions made by people and organizations, and on the 
forms of seeking consensus and building trust.  
How are socio-cultural changes in the region replicated in the field of media? 
I will not go into specific details outlining structural changes in the Baltic 
media systems. Instead I would like to point to the significance of new ICTs as 
one of the critical factors that shapes ways of life in today’s CEE. In relation to 
the weakness of newspaper publishing and reading tradition in the Baltic countries 
(Lithuania in this sense has the weakest tradition among the three states), 
print media gradually disappears from the newly arising media landscape, 
while television remains a public arena populated with commercial matters. The 
available niche is rapidly occupied by ICT media actors with their own 
standards of professionalism in news production.  
Indeed, the arrival of the new ICTs coincided with the uses of the neo-liberal 
ideology of promoting ideals of effectiveness and competition. New 
technologies, too, have brought extreme pluralisation leading to group 
polarization and clusterization of interests. On the one hand, these trends may be 
seen as highly empowering, contributing to pluralization and having 
democratizing effects. Yet, on the other hand, as we see in online users’ 
choices, individuals tend to follow those opinions which support their pre-
existing views or the pre-existing knowledge in the political sense.  
It appears that we indeed live in times of unprecedented change in terms of 
societal transformations and collective re-grouping. As seen in examples from 
CEE countries, new societal re-arrangements may emerge under conditions 
when the atmosphere of neo-liberal trends, weakness of print media tradition, 
growing individualization and group polarization are present at the same time. 
These factors strongly impact the quality and functioning of democracy and 
contribute to critical outcomes. 
Sükösd: The trends of media ownership, political institutions and political 
culture are now extended with a more social theory-driven approach to 
highlight extreme polarization, individualization, and also the impact of ICTs 
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and online media as well as the neo-liberal policies that support 
individualism and competition.  One should add that the capitalist and 
democratic dual transformation in CEE took place within a very short time, 
within one generation, and its intensity caused high levels of stress, anxiety, 
insecurity, and fatigue. 
May we continue with some provocations regarding our terminology? Václav 
used the term ‘de-globalization’ for characterising the regional trends 
regarding media ownership. Why ‘de-globalization’, and why not ‘de-
Westernization’ or ‘de-Europeanization’? We are talking about the 
withdrawal of Western European capital, not global capital. Would the term 
‘de-westernization’ or ‘de-Europeanization’ capture this process better? 
Auksė Balčytienė: You may also call it ‘de-Scandinavization’ from the Baltic 
perspective.  
Štětka: I see the term de-Westernization as already ‘occupied’ and used within 
international media scholarship in a different sense. In 2000, James Curran 
and Myung-Jin Park published a seminal volume called De-Westernizing 
Media Studies (Curran and Park 2000), in which they coined the term to 
emphasize the need to broaden the perspectives and approaches towards 
comparative media research, beyond the Western-centric models and 
theories. This is why I prefer to use the term de-globalization, despite of the 
fact that it describes the withdrawal of mostly Western type of ownership and 
Western investors. The concept of de-globalization also aims to highlight the 
gradual reversal of the process this region has been experiencing during most 
of the two decades after 1989, the process generally labelled as globalization 
of media, which was particularly visible in terms of media ownership 
structures.  
Audience: How about the term of ‘re-domestication’ or ‘de-  
transnationalization’ of media?  
Sükösd: These terms may suggest a neutral or positive meaning, while the 
other labels are more negative as they also refer to the trend of a decreasing 
media freedom in CEE.  
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Štětka: We certainly cannot say that effects of globalization were altogether 
positive in the CEE region. However, the process of de-globalization seems to 
have even more negative consequences. 
Bajomi-Lázár: Domestication and re-domestication could also be used as a 
metaphor for the re-domestication of rebel journalists who seek independence 
and seek to be critical. As the term also refers to the domestication of animals, 
it offers a fitting metaphor to describe the situation: the taming of the rebel 
journalist. In this metaphor, the watch-dog is re-interpreted as a ‘lap-dog’: a 
tamed, domesticated animal. 
Geopolitical considerations and Russia’s growing influence 
Sükösd: You all put the region into a larger transnational perspective and also 
emphasized that local social traditions and political culture matter. Using a 
truly global perspective, can we also relate media trends in our region to the 
emergence of the BRICS countries, in particular Russia and China (Sükösd 
2014)? There might be several layers to this, starting with the general global 
power shift from Western countries towards the BRICS, particularly from the 
US to China. We also witness the re-emergence of Russia as a strong regional 
power through a more proactive or even aggressive foreign policy, and 
military action and war in Ukraine.  Also, in terms of media ownership, how 
does the oligarchization of CEE media compare to post-Soviet Russia? During 
the Yeltsin period in Russia, seven major oligarchs built their vertical empires 
involving industrial (mostly petro-chemical) interests, political organizations, 
but also media empires and their own hitmen and links to the underground 
mafia world. These oligarchs allied with the Kremlin and other oligarchs, but 
time to time they also attacked each other. They tended to instrumentalize 
their media the same way as described in the case of contemporary Czech 
Republic by the ‘nuclear briefcase’ metaphor. Can we talk about 
‘Russification’ of CEE media in this particular meaning of oligarchization?  
Štětka: We need to engage more deeply with the term ‘oligarchization’. The 
literature as well as the public traditionally associate this term with Russia 
and other post-Soviet countries such as Ukraine or Kazakhstan. But recent 
scholarship identifies oligarchs in Western countries such as Britain or the US 
as well. In this respect I do not think it is appropriate to tie the concept to a 
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particular country such as Russia; oligarchization is certainly a much more 
universal phenomenon than that.  
Balčytienė: Among the Baltic countries, ‘oligarchization’ has been highest in 
Latvia, somewhat lower in Lithuania and of lowest degree in Estonia. In the 
Baltic region, recent changes in media ownership might be labelled as ‘de-
Nordification’ or ‘de-Scandinavization’. Still, another trend is also evident, 
namely the gradual increase of Estonian capital in the Baltic media. Russia has 
always been an issue of high significance in all three countries, for historical 
reasons. In spite of unmistakable polarization in the Lithuanian politics, 
dominant parties are quite strict, unanimous and consensual towards the so-
called ‘Russian factor’. For example, when the new media law was drafted in 
the early 1990s, it was stated that none of the media companies in Lithuania 
could be privatized or bought by foreign owners that have links to Russia. But 
as a matter of fact, Russia has never let the three Baltic countries out of its 
information space, and propagandistic attempts of information management 
have intensified and became more assertive in the past few years. Baltic 
governments reacted to this matter in their own – self-defensive – manner. 
One illustration is the situation with the Russian television station RTR 
Planeta: due to its manifest propaganda content, the broadcast was suspended 
and ceased for fixed periods both in Latvia and Lithuania. Alternative 
solutions to counter propaganda matters could have been imagined, for 
example, the establishment of a public service channel in the Russian 
language. I would support the idea of having such an alternative channel. 
There have been thoughts raised among the three governments about such a 
channel, but no agreement was reached.  
Bajomi-Lázár: The Hungarian case is a special one, because of an oligarch 
called Lajos Simicska, who was, until recently, a close associate of the Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán (Mérték Media Monitor 2014). However, the two are 
now fighting. This points to the question of who the master is? Who controls 
whom? Is it political parties or is it the business elites that control politicians? 
In Bulgaria and Romania, the business elites, often associated with the former 
security services and some of the political parties, are just puppets. In 
Hungary, however, it is hard to determine the setup of this power relation. In 
the Czech Republic, it could be the political elites who instrumentalise 
oligarchs. 
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Štětka: I do not think you can possibly instrumentalize the oligarchs [laughs]. 
In the Czech Republic the power lies clearly within five or six main oligarch 
families or clans that have been identified by the press. It is generally 
assumed that political parties have been acting in the interest of these 
oligarchic powers.  
Sükösd: Regarding the ‘Russian factor’, there are good investigative reports 
showing that the Kremlin  actually supports extreme right wing parties in 
Europe, for example Le Pen’s National Front in France, or Jobbik in Hungary 
(e.g., Juhász et al. 2015). By supporting the radical right wing, clearly 
Eurosceptic parties, the goal of the Kremlin is to destabilize the European 
Union. The extreme right is not marginal any more: for example, Jobbik is a 
xenophobic, radical nationalist party that came second in recent polls and 
might have a chance to win the next elections in 2018.  The Hungarian 
government’ foreign policy orientation already shifted towards Russia, and 
the Kremlin’s support for the extreme right also contributes to the pro-
Russian orientation of Hungary, just like some countries in the region. Some 
Hungarian media organizations, including extreme right wing news portals, 
also seem to enjoy support from Russian sources (Juhász et al. 2015). In your 
opinion, what are the trends regarding the Russian factor in politics and 
media in CEE?  
Štětka: In the Czech Republic, President Milos Zeman's Party of Citizens' 
Rights (SPO) is sponsored by LukOil (Russia's second largest oil company) 
and has recently managed to secure a small number of seats in the Senate of 
the Czech Parliament as well as in the regional governments.  Some activities 
of President Zeman in relation to foreign policy are obviously motivated by 
his fondness of Russia. He is one of the few highest representatives of the EU 
countries to have participated at the recent official celebrations of the WW2 
anniversary in Moscow. There are clear indications that there is a strong 
Russian involvement in Czech politics by implicit or explicit support of 
certain actors who then emphasize the financial and political interest of 
Russia and essentially try to destabilize the European Union.  
Sükösd: This presents clear risks for Europe and contributes strongly to 
instability, vulnerability, and volatility of democracy and democratic media in 
CEE.   
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Balčytienė: Generally, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and the geo-
political crisis in the neighbourhood works as supplementary factor 
contributing to the atmosphere of instability and insecurity in the whole Baltic 
Sea region. Lithuania does not have an extreme right wing party. But the 
political atmosphere may be de-stabilized, and continuously challenged, with 
matters of unresolved matters of historic concern. One example is a party in 
Lithuania that has national rather than ideological aspirations – this is the 
Electoral Action of Poles that seeks to represent the rights of the Polish 
minority (which is around 7%) in Lithuania. For several decades conflicts 
have been running between the national government’s conservative language 
policies and minority demands. History is alive and many unresolved 
conflicts are re-used by present day populist politics.  
Sükösd: Can this be understood in a way that Russia is instrumentalizing the 
traditional tension in Polish-Lithuanian relations? A similar strategy may be 
observed in case of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine. Russia supports a 
Hungarian nationalist discourse that advances the Hungarian minority in 
Ukraine, sometimes even with territorial claims. This discourse may actually 
question the very legitimacy of the existence of Ukraine suggesting that 
Eastern Ukraine should belong to Russia, and Western Ukraine may belong 
partly to Hungary. The Hungarian extreme right wing Jobbik party utilizes 
this discourse in coalition with the Kremlin. 
Bajomi-Lázár: As regards the issue of who is in charge: much of the resources 
available in the media market are controlled by the state. For example, the 
state is a major advertiser in Romania. In Hungary there is a broadcasting 
fund, and in Slovenia there is a press subsidies system. This means that these 
resources are controlled by political elites rather than media oligarchs. One of 
the problems with the Simicska case in Hungary is that, due to the recent 
disagreement between him and the prime minister, Simicska cannot access 
these state resources. Orbán can basically strangle him by closing the tap of 
state resources. 
Štětka: In some countries these resources play a bigger role than in others. But 
in general, resources available to media, or found within media markets, are 
not comparable to the resources in other industry segments. Media 
expenditures might be negligible for the oligarchs compared to revenues from 
other industries or business which they are engaged in.  
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Bajomi-Lázár: But those revenues might also depend on the state and the will 
of the political elites that regulate the economy. The political elites control 
regulations through which they can influence virtually anything. 
Sükösd: I am afraid it is cold war times again one more time in some respects. 
More exactly, it could be already labelled as hot war times, considering the 
recent annexation of the Crimea by Russia and the ongoing war in Eastern 
Ukraine.  
Štětka: But it is also different from cold war times. It would not make sense for 
Russia to invest in media across the CEE’s or the West. What they are doing is 
that they are engaged in an enormous disinformation operation on the 
internet. They are paying people to comment on online media sites to produce 
disinformation, which appears to be a much more effective strategy than the 
old-school direct propaganda. It is harder to detect the source and producers 
of the information, which creates an environment of confusion where people 
can no longer know what to believe in or how to separate fact from lies.  
Audience: Weak civil societies in CEE, but also in other EU countries, create a 
playground for populist movements which affect the media and give rise to 
the ‘one man, one party’ type populist leaders. These one-man leaders are 
then utilized by oligarchs, as oligarchs follow the money. However, in small 
economies wealth is created not only domestically, but also by export, trade, 
selling and buying. This means that the oligarchs themselves are also very 
much dependent on exports and imports. But how can they follow the money 
there?  
Bajomi-Lázár: The Hungarian case actually suggests that it is in fact the 
European Union that is sponsoring the autocratic Orbán regime and its 
oligarchs. This raises the question of why the EU sponsors a semi-dictatorial 
leader and his regime. It is suggested by many observers that a huge part of 
all EU support in Hungary is channelled to the oligarchs associated with the 
ruling Fidesz party. In the case of Hungary, this can take place because the 
European Union is afraid to take measures for fear of a domino effect. The 
immediate reaction to punitive action by the EU could be an increase in 
Euroscepticism. The populist Orbán Government may also consider leaving 
the Union, which could start a chain reaction, leading to the complete 
disintegration of the EU. 
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Sükösd: There could be other reasons as well. The tender and procurement 
processes that distribute large EU grants is corrupted and not transparent, 
allowing local oligarchs such as Simicska and others receive the major bulk of 
the EU tenders for infrastructure development. It is a grave matter as it is 
eventually the money of German and Scandinavian taxpayers that is 
distributed to CEE oligarchs who in turn support semi-dictatorial regimes in 
the region. Also, there is no clear procedure for political accountability of 
member states in the EU. When these states applied for EU membership, as 
candidate states they had to fulfill conditions for membership, including the 
Copenhagen Criteria (CC). The CC declares that membership requires 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, and human 
rights. However, once these countries fulfilled the CC and became member 
states, the EU never developed sanctioning or expelling protocols for 
countries violating the CC or other EU rules, values, and norms. 
A final question regarding geopolitical considerations: how has the situation 
in the Ukraine as an active war zone had an impact on the media in Baltic 
countries and CEE in general? The Kremlin developed a war propaganda 
discourse regarding ‘near neighbour’ countries with aggressive visual and 
textual content. For example, the well-known Russian imperialist video “I am 
a Russian occupant”, tweeted by the deputy prime minister of the Russian 
Federation, features rockets pointing towards the Baltic States right at their 
border and towards the West, coupled with strong language towards the EU 
and the US (Newsweek 2015). How does this kind of warmongering media 
machine affect the Baltic states, and is this relevant for other CEE countries? 
Are there counter-measures in Lithuanian media? 
Balčytienė: The geopolitical crisis might also play a consolidating function and 
contribute to professionalization of media and journalism. In times of high 
manipulation, falsification and lies, information wars and propaganda 
coming from the Russian media, professional journalism appears to be a 
fundamental source for truthful information, analysis and self-orientation. 
Still, as the example mentioned earlier suggests, the Lithuanian government 
took a protective measure and played an authoritative role to decide what 
kind of information the population should receive.  
Štětka: In the Czech Republic this process has been leading towards greater 
polarization of society, although the vast majority of the people are pro-
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Western, supporting the EU rather than Russia in relation to the Ukraine 
conflict. On the one hand, the pro-Russian voices are still a minority, but 
getting more aggressive and attacking especially the public service media. If 
this discourse further escalates it could affect the professionalism of the public 
media. On the other hand, the pro-Western side tends to adopt a very 
defensive approach, labeling the opposition as traitors or enemies of the state, 
which is obviously an exaggeration. 
Bajomi-Lázár: Regarding the issue of information warfare and Russian 
disinformation through ‘trolls’ and media hacks: this would raise the question 
of why Russia does not launch radio stations if it is really engaged in an 
information warfare.  
Sükösd: In a sense, pro-Russian forces have already captured the public/state 
media in Hungary, because the Orbán-government is decidedly pro-Russian 
in several matters and state media under government control clearly supports 
that. Russia also supports extreme right wing political parties and other 
organizations that already have developed their own partisan, pro-Kremlin 
media sector. 
Audience: The oligarchs have significant interests in capturing the media. 
Through providing pro-government news they ensure government loyalty 
and secure their economic position in other industry sectors. What happens 
when an oligarch becomes a rogue oligarch as a result of a disagreement with 
government (like in case of Simicska in Hungary)? Can the oligarchs play a 
role in re-establishing democratic roles and ethics? 
Štětka: If people are turning to the oligarchs to save democracy, like 
Poroshenko in Ukraine or Khodorkovsky in Russia, this only demonstrates 
the depth of the crisis we are in right now. Indeed, there are some oligarchs in 
the CEE countries who might have more or less internalized Western business 
ethics and share democratic values - providing of course that it does not 
interfere too much with their business interests. However, too often they are 
products of the local political culture, which itself mirrors the flawed 
transformation the region underwent in the past two decades. This flawed 
transformation is a long-term process, and to reverse it is beyond the capacity 
of the oligarchs, even if they decided to be part of it, which I do not think 
most of them really want to. They are largely part of the problem, not the 
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solution, to use the popular catchphrase. I am afraid we are only harvesting 
the seeds sown at the beginning of the transformation process, and it will take 
a long time to change the political culture to resemble more democratic 
countries. But this only highlights the need to care about the media in the 
region, and to protect the space for free and independent journalism. 
Otherwise the road towards authoritarianism will be rid of some of the last 
remaining obstacles.  
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